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ABSTRACT
It is generally hypothesised that the efficacy of monetary policy is 
seriously jeopardised by financial liberalisation. However, the 
empirical evidence to test this proposition is somewhat scanty, 
especially for LDCs. In this paper, we use an SVAR type model to 
derive certain causal measures, which can prove useful as indicators 
of monetary policy potency. Bootstrapping experiments are then 
conducted to test whether liberalisation has weakened the role of 
monetary policy in India. We find an attenuation of the relationship 
between the monetary base and money supply as well as that between 
money and nominal income. Our results can thus be interpreted as 
supportive of the hypothesis.
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The world of finance, throughout its history, has typified the well-known 
adage “ Nothing is permanent, except change”. There have, however, 
been periods when change has been gradual and evolutionary, and others 
when fundamental and even cataclysmic “ shape-shifting” ( a term due to 
Kane (1984)) has occurred within a relatively short span of time. The last 
three decades have been witness to just such an episodic “space-shifting” 
in financial markets, institutions and technology on a global scale, with 
profound consequences for both monetary theory and policy.
These recent changes have usually been subsumed under the generic 
term financial liberalisation, which is intended to encompass two 
distinct but interconnected phenomena viz. financial deregulation and 
financial innovation. The latter two phenomena may be viewed as 
complementary, mutually reinforcing, almost feeding on each other. 
Largely as a consequence of the Keynesian legacy, the post World War II 
period was characterised by extensive financial regulations in most 
countries. Following Blundell-Wignall et al (1990), these may be 
classified into two broad categories as follows:
(i) “ rate -  quantity” (R-Q) regulations on bank deposits and loans 
(e.g. interest ceilings on deposits and loans, aggregate and sectoral 
credit controls, capital requirements etc.) and
(ii) “powers” (P) regulations on the scope of activities of categories of 
financial institutions (e.g. underwriting of securities, combining of 
banking and insurance, participation in money markets etc.).
Financial deregulation may then be understood to refer to the extent and 
pace of dismantling of the R-Q and P regulations (see OECD (1989) for 
a perspective on this process in the OECD countries).
There are pronounced semantic difficulties in the definition of financial 
innovations (Podolski (1986) ). Most analysts prefer to take a pragmatic 
approach and use the term flexibly to include not only new financial 
instruments (e.g. swaps, options, junk bonds, CDs etc.) and institutions 
(e.g. financial futures, money market mutual funds(MMMFs), pension 
funds etc.) but also adoption of new practices by existing institutions 
(such as home equity loans, floating rate loans, ATMs, NOWs etc.)1 
This paper aims to study the impact of financial innovations on the 
conduct of monetary policy in India. The next Section summarises the 
received theoretical literature in this area. The framework of the study is 
outlined in Section 3, whereas Section 4 sets out the econometric
1 Further the term financial innovation is elastic enough to include not only domestic 




























































































methodology. Section 5 is devoted to the interpretation of the results of 
our econometric exercise, with Section 6 tying up the conclusions.
2.Monetary Policy in a Liberalised Context
The process of financial change briefly noted above has impinged on the 
U.S. and U.K. financial systems in the 1970s, on most other advanced 
countries in the 1980s and on the LDCs only in the last decade. The 
change has been unevenly distributed across countries, and even though 
the general direction of movement has been unambiguously forward, the 
pace has varied between countries owing to intrinsic structural 
differences rooted in contestability of markets, structure of competition, 
industrial concentration and "financial literacy” in general.
Prior to the onset of financial liberalisation, the prevailing paradigm for 
monetary policy rested on the famous triad of instruments-intermediate 
targets/indicators-objectives.2 The guiding principles behind the triad 
were essentially threefold:
(i) The intermediate targets (usually simple-sum or Divisia monetary 
aggregates) were “controllable” via the instruments (either a short­
term interest rate or the monetary base) within tolerable margins of 
error.
(ii) The monetary targets bore a stable relationship with 
macroeconomic aggregates (such as output, inflation and long-term 
interest rates) so that the intermediate targets served both as early 
warning signals of portending changes in the macro-aggregates, as 
well as guideposts for the intended trajectories of these aggregates.
(iii) The flexible exchange rate regime currently in operation, implied a 
certain independence for the pursuit of national monetary policies 
(in the case of the EU, this statement has to be suitably qualified).
Financial liberalisation seems to have irreversibly jeopardised all three of 
the above premises. Firstly, as noted by Tobin (1983), the leverage 
exerted by the monetary authorities on non-financial variables, was 
precisely because money bore an exogenously fixed nominal interest rate, 
inducing portfolio substitution between “money” and “non-money” 
assets, in response to changes in interest rate levels. The process of 
financial liberalisation implies a greater role for market forces in the 
pricing of bank deposits, whose demand thus becomes more dependent 
on the spread (between nominal rates on money and near money assets) 
than on the level of nominal rates. Since monetary authorities are much




























































































better at influencing short-term rate levels than the spread, this factor 
seriously erodes their ability to control monetary aggregates.3 A similar 
argument can be developed in the context of monetary base control, using 
the classic Brunner-Meltzer money supply model (Jordan (1984)). 
Secondly, the link between monetary aggregates and important 
macroeconomic magnitudes (especially nominal income) has been 
rendered tenuous (in the wake of financial liberalisation) due to a host of 
factors such as
(i) the blurring of the distinction between money and near-money.
(ii) the breakdown of the money demand function (Akhtar (1983), 
Cotula (1984) etc.)4
(iii) the easing of credit and liquidity constraints (owing to the 
emergence of variable rate lending and large-scale “liability 
management”- see Goodhart (1986, 1989)) and
(iv) the rising role of arbitrageurs in financial markets, which has 
introduced volatility in the yield curve (Brown & Manasse (1989)).
In the IS-LM framework, the LM curve becomes both steep as well as 
stochastic (Tobin (1983)).
Finally, the international dimension of financial liberalisation is reflected 
in a greater integration of global capital markets in recent years. 
International capital flows, always on the lookout for profitable portfolio 
opportunities, are quick to respond to domestic interest changes, setting 
up a tendency for real interest differentials between countries, to become 
insignificant. This implies, of course, that the pursuit of domestic 
monetary policy is seriously circumscribed by the unpredictable 
responses of global capital flows.
The upshot of the previous discussion appears to be a vastly reduced 
potency of monetary policy consequent to financial liberalisation. This 
conclusion is not true in its entirety. Several transmission channels will 
still remain open, and a few new ones will emerge. A change in interest 
rates could still affect aggregate consumption via its impact on permanent 
income, as well as through intertemporal substitution (Bayoumi & 
Koujianou (1989)), though this channel is likely to be a sluggish one. 
More importantly, as stressed by Goodhart (1989), the increased elasticity 
of global capital inflows to domestic monetary policies, implies that the 
reduced effects on domestic demand are compensated by a greater impact 
on exchange rates. The latter has, as a matter of fact, emerged as a major 
channel of monetary policy in several OECD countries, in recent years. A 
major advantage of the exchange rate channel is claimed to be its direct
3 Currency, no doubt, is an exception to this phenomenon, but most likely, an 
increasingly unimportant one.
4 This feature is somewhat mitigated if Divisia indices, rather than simple-sum 




























































































effect on input prices and inflation, but on the flip side, it makes 
investment in the manufacturing sector tradeables, unduly dependent on 
the vacillations in domestic monetary policy (thus impeding the long­
term growth prospects of the economy). Finally, the credibility of the 
Central Bank will have a critical bearing on the extent to which it can 
influence long-term interest rates via short-term rates, in a liberalised 
environment.
The above arguments have been developed in the context of short-term 
interest rates as the operating target. But parallel arguments apply even 
under monetary base control. The authorities, in this case, can undeniably 
exert leverage on the level of interest rates via their ability to control the 
base. But with the demand for loans being inelastic to the level of interest 
rates, loans can be funded through wholesale deposits. Thus with low 
reserve ratios there can be major fluctuations in monetary and credit 
aggregates, relative to any given base. Even if required reserve ratios are 
high, a rise in the general level of interest rates widens bank spreads, 
simply leading to a switch in the avenues of financing rather than to any 
real effects on borrowing.
3.Framework of the Study
The primary focus of the study is to analyse the likely impact of financial 
liberalisation on the effectiveness of monetary policy in India. Most of 
the existing empirical studies on various aspects of financial liberalisation 
have been located in the context of developed countries. The LDC case 
differs fundamentally in that financial liberalisation is often “government 
driven” rather than an autonomous evolution in response to market 
forces. Additionally, the financial innovations, very often, are virtually 
transplanted from abroad, with little adaptation to domestic conditions. 
Together, these features imply that the financial liberalisation process in 
LDCs lacks spontaneity, is somewhat artificial and often premature, and 
hence may interface with policy in ways quite distinct from the pattern 
recorded in advanced countries. Thus, our study, it is hoped, would be of 
more than mere passing interest, as yet one more country case-study. 
Empirical modelling in this area is severely handicapped by the 
difficulties of finding appropriate proxies for financial innovations and 
their diffusion. The difficulty is particularly pronounced for countries 
where innovations have been evolving in a steady gradual stream. The 
Indian case, by contrast, presents two well-delineated epochs -  the period 




























































































post-1991 period in which substantial liberalisation has taken place.5 
Thus important insights into the financial liberalisation-monetary policy 
nexus can be gained by a comparative analysis of these two epochs, 
which we term as Period I (Jan 1977 to Dec 1991) and Period II (Jan 
1992 to Dec 2000). The choice of these periods is econometrically 
substantiated in the next section.
It is not the purpose of this paper to go into the details of the financial 
liberalisation programme in India. These have been carefully documented 
in two recent books (Joshi & Little (1996) and Sen & Vaidya (1997 )) as 
also in the Annual Reports of the RBI (Reserve Bank of India -  the 
central bank of the country) especially over the years 1992-1997. It is 
important, however, to remember, that in several respects the process of 
financial liberalisation in India is far from complete. Firstly, on the 
international front, capital inflows are still regulated and exchange 
controls persist in various guises. Secondly, there are important R-Q 
regulations on banks and non-bank financial institutions (e.g. committed 
loans and SLR requirements). Finally, it is only very recently (2000), that 
a beginning is being attempted with the relaxation of P regulations (the 
emergence of MMMFs and banking-insurance combines on a limited 
scale). Even this brief description should suffice to make it clear that the 
potency of monetary policy in India need not necessarily have been 
eroded in the wake of financial liberalisation. Substantial liquidity 
constraints on aggregate spending may still persist, and global inflows are 
not substantial enough to interfere importantly with the conduct of 
monetary policy. The role of monetary policy then becomes an open 
issue, in the settlement of which, empirical econometric methods can 
have an important role to play. Further, the scope of our inquiry could be 
meaningfully focussed on the following two aspects:
(i) the relationship between the operating target and the monetary 
aggregates and
(ii) the relationship between monetary aggregates and indicators of 
macroeconomic activity.
A comparative analysis of the above two relationships over Periods I and 
II should then yield useful insights into the issues of our concern.6 So far 
as the operating targets are concerned, the RBI has traditionally shown a 
predilection for the monetary base (and perhaps rightly so, in view of the 
shallowness of the market for Treasury bills and dated government 
securities, which renders transmission from short-term to long-term rates
5 This is not to deny that some important innovations had already taken place well 
before 1991, or that regulatory elements are completely absent in recent times but, as 
a general description, few observers would quarrel with this scheme.
0 Three facets of the relationships are singled out for analysis viz. the strength of 




























































































rather tenuous). The monetary aggregate chosen for our analysis is M3, 
the broad money aggregate- both because the RBI continues to rely on it 
as a monetary policy intermediate target, and also because the narrow 
money concept Ml loses much of its relevance in the context of financial 
liberalisation (Goodhart (1986)). Additionally, Ml does not fit well into 
the current framework of monetary analysis, based on the balance sheet 
identity for banks, as spelt out, for example in Baltensperger (1980). A 
reliable Divisia aggregate is not available in the Indian context over a 
substantially long period, otherwise it would have been the natural choice 
in a study of this kind.
In assessing the impact of monetary policy , one is interested in the 
effects of monetary policy on real output as well as prices . Since the lags 
involved may often be less than one year , an annual model has severe 
limitations . We therefore resort to a monthly model, which also yields 
substantial high-frequency data suitable to the techniques that we propose 
to apply. However, the decision to work with monthly data is not without 
its own set of problems. Because data on Indian GDP is unavailable 
except on an annual (or semi-annual) basis, we have to proxy the output 
variable by the IIP (Index of Industrial Production) on which monthly 
data is available. This is a significant limitation, increasingly so in recent 
years when services are becoming predominant in national output. 
Nevertheless there is no reason to believe that the impact of money on the 
non-industrial sector is likely to differ substantially from the impact on 
the industrial sector. Thus, at least, as a first approximation, our analysis 
is not devoid of meaningful interpretations.
The following combinations of series were studied:
(i) B and M
(ii) M, I and P
Here B is the monetary base, M is the broad money measure M3, I is the 
index of industrial production and P is the wholesale price index. Data on 
all these variables (upto December 1999) is available from the RBI 
Report on Currency and Finance (annual publication), supplemented for 
the year 2000 by the monthly RBI Bulletins.
4.Methodological Considerations
There are three distinct aspects to our study. The first stage pertains to the 
identification of monetary policy shocks and shocks to the non-policy 
variables in the system. In the second stage, frequency domain methods 




























































































The final stage is concerned with bootstrapping some of the estimates 
derived at the second stage.
A.Identification of Shocks
Much attention has been devoted in recent years to the identification of 
monetary policy shocks (Strongin (1995), Sims & Zha (1995), Bernanke 
& Mihov (1998) etc.). The recommended approach is based on an SVAR 
( structural VAR). The superiority of the SVAR approach over other 
approaches , such as the “narrative approach” of Romer & Romer (1994), 
has been demonstrated, among others, by Gordon & Leeper (1994) and 
Bagliano & Favero (1997), and derives from the incorporation of the 
potential endogeneity of monetary policy in a more transparent way, in 
the SVAR approach. This endogeneity, if not properly modelled, can 
contaminate the estimated response of macroeconomic variables to a 
monetary policy shock.
It is now customary to include in the SVAR, an international commodity 
price index (which we call P*) to account for the so-called “liquidity” and 
“price” puzzles (Strongin (1995), Kim (1999) etc.). Our SVAR thus 
includes the following five variables 
P*, I, P, M and B
The international commodity price index is measured in US$7. The 
omission of an interest rate variable in the model may seem rather 
unusual. However, in the Indian context, until very recently (i.e. 1998), 
the nominal interest rate structure was heavily regulated. The impact of 
the real interest variable on the economy, was primarily felt through the 
inflation rate.
The econometrics of the SVAR is too well-known to merit a detailed 





Y(t - 1) 
X(f-l).
+ B 5 ,(0
5 ,(0 .
( 1)
where Y(t) is the vector of non-policy variables (P*, I, P), X(t) is a vector 
of monetary variables (M, B) and SY(t), Sx(t) are vectors of structural 
shocks to the non-policy variables and monetary variables respectively. 
Further Go describes the contemporaneous relations among the variables,





























































































G(L) is a finite-order matrix lag polynomial and the matrix B records the 
impact of shocks on the variables in the system.8










where A(L) = G0 'G(L) and [uY(t), ux(t)]T is the vector of reduced-form 
residuals (or innovations), which are related to the structural shocks via
Uy(t)
= B '5 ,  (O'Gq
Sx (t)_
(3)
For identification of the structural parameters, we make the following 
assumptions:
(i) [Sv(t), Sx(t)]T is a vector of contemporaneously uncorrelated 
disturbances.
(ii) The non-policy variables do not simultaneously react to the policy 
variables. This assumption is a reasonable one for monthly data. 
Within a month firms may not adjust their output and prices to 
unanticipated changes in monetary policy, due to menu costs etc. 
(Sims & Zha(1995)).The converse reactions, however, are allowed.
(iii) To capture the operational procedures of monetary policy in India, 
we posit that
«„(/) = mue(0 + SM(t) (4)
uB(t) = <t>SM(t) + S„(t) (5)
where uM(t), uB(t) are the innovations and SM (t), SB(t) are the structural 
disturbances to M and B respectively.
(4) is the standard money-multiplier relationship, whereas (5) is an 
elementary adjustment rule of monetary base control, in which the base b 
is adjusted by a factor 0 to shocks in M. The extreme cases of full and nil 
adjustment correspond to c() = -1 and (|) = 0, respectively.
Model (3) now assumes the following appearance
8 B need not necessarily be a diagonal matrix, non-zero off-diagonal elements 
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We impose the additional restriction that (f> = -1 (which is tested later). 
This makes (6) an over-identified system.
The starting point of our analysis is the reduced form (2), which we 
estimate (by OLS) over the full period of our analysis (Jan 1977 to Dec 
2000) with 6 lags. In spite of the evident non-stationarity of the variables, 
the model was estimated in log-levels, with no imposition of 
cointegrating relations. This is done to circumvent a long-run 
identification problem, which may otherwise crop up (Sims et al (1990) 
and Hendry (1996)). The model is estimated with monthly seasonal 
dummies and lag selection was done via Sims’(1980) procedure. This 
yielded a lag of 6. As is to be expected, this benchmark model shows 
considerable evidence of parameter instability. The traditional literature 
on structural breaks presumes that the break point is known to the 
investigator. In the Indian case, we know that the reforms process was 
initiated politically in June 1991, but it would be naive to presume that 
this date also coincides with the structural break of the econometric 
model. The change might have been anticipated for some time and on the 
other hand, there is also the possibility that its consequences might take 
some time to impact on the economy. It thus seems more reasonable to 
assume an interval around the date of the episodic exogenous event, as 
the possible interval, within which the structural break has occurred. As a 
matter of fact, we take two such potential intervals, viz. April 1985 - 
April 1987, and Jan 1990 -  Dec 1992. The choice of the latter has already 
been explained, whereas the former is considered to explicitly allow for 
the view held by several economists that liberalisation had already begun 
earlier under the Rajiv Gandhi government in 1986. The method 
proposed by Andrews (1993) seems particularly appropriate to the 
problem at hand. Andrews indictes how the hypothesis for parameter 
constancy over a particular interval may be tested against various 
alternatives. Let the given interval be expressed as (rt 1,7x2) where the 
truncation points til and tc2 are expressed as fractions of the total 
sampling interval. Further, define X = [(1 -7t 1 )7t2]/[tt 1(1 -7x2)]. Andrews 
tabulates critical values for combinations of X and p (number of 
regressors). The maximum number of regressors considered by Andrews 
is p=20 ; however this figure is likely to be substantially exceeded in 




























































































values of X in the range (1,2), these critical values seem to be 
approximately 1.12 times the critical values of the chi-squared 
distribution. The test statistic in the regression case is simply the 
maximum over all the usual Chow chi-squared statistics, evaluated 
successively at each of the data points in the interval under consideration. 
In Table 1 we denote this quantity as Sup W(7t). The results of the 
stability tests are reported in Table 1 for each of the 5 equations of our 
model. The intervals of our potential structural breaks can be expressed as 
(0.33, 0.41) and (0.52, 0.60) with X = 1.4 in both cases. The value for p is 
31 (6 lags each of 5 variables together with a constant). Resorting to the 
extrapolation noted above, the approximate critical values are 50.54 (5% 
level) and 58.72 (1% level). Table 1 indicates that in the first interval, 
evidence for structural instability occurs only in the P* and M equations, 
whereas the evidence for instability is much stronger in the more recent 
interval considered. Thus, we are led to suppose that a major structural 
break has occurred in the period Jan 1990 to Dec 1992. The table also 
indicates for each variable exhibiting a break, the point where the Chow 
statistic is a maximum, which may be identified as the actual structural 
breakpoint. We find that the breakpoints for the various equations are 
clustered around Dec 1991, and hence we take this as a dividing 
threshhold. Thus, we identify Period I as Jan 1977 to Dec 1991 and 
Period II as Jan 1992 to Dec 2000.
Lag selection for the reduced forms in both periods was done employing 
the usual Sims’ criterion. The optimal lag was 7 for the first period and 6 
for the more recent period. In the interests of uniformity, we chose a 
common lag of 6 for both periods. As emphasised by Spanos (1990) and 
Hendry (1996), it is important to subject the reduced form VAR to 
detailed specification searches. The important misspecification tests are
(i) LM test for autocorrelated residuals
(ii) LM test for ARCH effects in the residuals
(iii) The Shenton-Bowman (1977) test for normality of residuals.
We executed these tests using PCFIML 8.0 (Doornik & Hendry (1995)), 
and the results are reported in Table 2. These tests9 are essentially based 
on the residuals from each equation of the reduced form VAR. By and 
large, the tests do not indicate serious model inadequacy. The only 
misspecified equation seems to be that for P* (international commodity 
price index) in both periods -  probably reflecting the fact that the Indian 
macroeconomic variables have low explanatory power for this 
international variable. There is also some evidence for non-normality and





























































































ARCH effects for the monetary base in Period II, which we have not been 
able to successfully account for.
In addition, we performed the vector portmanteau test ( described in 
Doornik & Hendry (1995) p.215) to judge overall goodness-of-fit of the 
reduced forms over the two periods I and II. This statistic, which we call 
as VP, has the %2 [n2(s-m)] distribution, with n the number of dependent 
variables in the system, m the lag length of the dependent variables 
(assumed equal for all the dependent variables) and s the lag length over 
which the autocorrelations are tested. For our VARs, n = 5, m = 6 and we 
select s = 8. Our VP for the two periods has values 48.15 and 62.44 
respectively , which are well below the critical values for a x~ (50), thus 
reinforcing our confidence in the models estimated.
We rewrite (6) in the form
’s P: '  1 0 0 0 0  ' U p.
s , D2l 1 0 0 0 » /
s , = Du ° 3 2 1 0 0 up
Su Dit Di2 Dn 1 Du UM
_ V D u D51 O 53 -0 D 5 5 . _U B_
(7)
Model (7) is estimated separately over Periods I and II, and the resulting 
models are referred to as SVAR I and SVAR II. The models were 
estimated using RATS and in both versions the over-identifying 
restriction <|> = -1, is tested for significance. The restriction was supported 
for Period I but not for Period II. This is in tune with the RBI’s observed 
reliance on M3 as an indicator in Period I10.Thus, in the final set of 
estimations, SVAR I was estimated with the restriction <|> = -1, whereas in 
the other model (j> was endogenously estimated. Each of the models 
produces a vector of structural shocks, which serves as the basis for the 
second stage of our analysis.
The contemporaneous coefficients are presented in Table 3. Most of the 
coefficients exhibit the signs that we would expect from theoretical 
reasoning. Thus, for example, we expect an unanticipated increase in 
world commodity prices P* to have a simultaneous negative effect on 
industrial production I, and a positive effect on domestic prices P and 
money demand M. In a similar manner of reasoning, the other expected 
effects can be derived. Thus, we expect D2), D32, and (f> to be negative, 
whereas all the other coefficients are expected to be positive (except D52 
whose sign is uncertain).Our estimated coefficients in Table 3 have 
wrong signs for D32 in both periods, while D42 has the wrong sign only in




























































































Period I. This is once again, probably, a reflection of "the fact that I is a 
rather weak proxy for national income. All the other coefficients have the 
expected signs. The coefficients in the last row of the matrix in (7), 
indicate how the monetary authorities respond to unanticipated changes 
in the non-policy variables. Thus the base B is reduced, when either P* or 
P display unanticipated increases, but actually increased when I shows 
unexpected increases (i.e. such increases are treated as growth or 
productivity impulses and accommodated, rather than interpreted as signs 
of impending inflation).
Additional insights into our models can be obtained by the Forecast Error 
Variance Decomposition (FEVD) of I and P due to money supply shocks. 
This is reported in Table 4 for forecast horizons of 6, 12 and 24 months. 
Three features emerge strongly from the Table viz.
(i) the contribution of money supply shocks to P is of a much higher 
order of magnitude than their contribution to I
(ii) the importance of money supply shocks declines with the forecast 
horizon (in case of I as well as P) and
(iii) the importance of money supply shocks has decreased in Period II 
as compared to Period 1 ( for both I and P)
The last feature, in particular, is consistent with the overall conclusions 
that follow from the subsequent discussion.
B.Causal Analysis
We may recall that the main aim of this paper is to analyse the 
interrelationships between the monetary base and money supply on the 
one hand, and the money supply and macroeconomic aggregates on the 
other, over the two periods I and II. This may be done via the various 
structural shocks identified in the first stage of our analysis. We thus 
focus on the following entities obtained from SVARs I and II
(i) SM and SB
(ii) Sm, S[ and SP
The methodology that we now adopt was first enunciated in the much 
neglected second half of Granger’s (1969) celebrated causality paper. 
Therein Granger had proposed a novel decomposition of the cross­
spectrum to derive the causal coherency and other related concepts such 
as the causal lag and causal gain. Granger’s concept of causal coherency 
and the Geweke (1982, 1984) measures of linear feedback by frequency 
are isomorphic. However, the latter are relatively complicated to compute 
as they require the factorization of the spectral density matrix (Whittle 
(1969)), whereas for small systems (order upto 4), the Granger measures 
are derivable in a straightforward fashion. Additionally, instead of a 




























































































calculation of at least three distinct measures (mentioned above), all of 
which yield useful information about the behaviour of the series.11 
Stiassny (1994) has also exhibited interesting connections between such 
causal measures and the FEVD of traditional VAR analysis.
As the various structural shocks are contemporaneously orthogonal, we 
can employ the simple causal model discussed at length by Granger 
(1969). In the trivariate case the model is simply
X(t)~ a,(L) b,(L) c,(f.)" '* ( / ) “
Y(t) = a2(L) b2(L) c 2 ( L ) Y(t) + e2(t)
Z(f) a,(L) b,(L) c,(L) £,(0
(Here aj(L), bj(L) and Cj(L), j = 1,2,3 are polynomials in the lag operator 
L, with the constant term zero, the £j(t) are contemporaneously 
uncorrelated with var {Ej(t)} = a / ,  j = 1,2,3 )
We now denote by a, the expression aj[exp(-ico)], with bj, Cj similarly 
defined. Further, let a  = (ar l), P = (b2-l), Y = (c3-l)
The partial cross-spectrum between X(t) and Y(t) given Z(t) is known to 
be (at any frequency CO)
„  a fa 2_b2a2 crfcr2/h2 a 2o 2bta
C xr tz~ J  A ~ "~A
where
A = <7?\/3y -  c2i>312 + a \ |c,6. -  btyf  + <7, |V 2 -  ct/3\2 
Granger proposed the decomposition of (9) as follows
CxrTz = Cm + Ci2) + C0) (11)
In (11), C(1> represents the interactions between X and Y through Z, C(2) 
the causal influence of X on Y given Z, and C<3) the causal influence of Y 
on X given Z. We now define the three quantities of our interest as 
follows.




11 We are not making any general claims for the superiority of Granger’s method over 
Geweke’s- only maintaining that that the former is more germane to the problem at 
hand. Geweke’s method is possibly better suited for higher order systems. No Monte 




























































































C(X —> K t  Z) = 1 j ( 12)
j X'tzJyìZ
at any frequency co, where fxtz and fYtz are the conditional power spectra 
of X (given Z) and of Y (given Z).
In turn, the conditional power spectrum of X (given Z) is defined by
f x i  z ~
l l̂2 + n 2
A
( 13)
with fYTz defined analogously.
Causal las: The causal phase lag function from X to Y (given Z) is 
defined as
<14>
for each frequency co. (The intuitive interpretation of this concept is given 
in Granger & Hatanaka (1964) p. 115-118).
Causal Gain: The causal gain from X to Y ( given Z) is defined as
G(X -» Y T Z) = C(X -> Y T Z) /M - c (2>\w fr iz
for each frequency co.
(15)
The above concepts are notably distinct from the usual concepts of 
coherency, phase and gain used in spectral analysis. More specifically, 
the causal coherency measures the strength of causality from one variable 
to another at each frequency, the causal lag is the delay in transmission 
effects from one variable to another and the causal gain is the impact of a 
unit change in one variable on another. Further, in computing these 
quantities, we are correcting for the influence of other variables in the 
system (i.e Z in the above definitions).
We now apply the above definitions to the problem at hand. To gauge the 
influence of monetary policy shocks on the macro economy, we proceed 
as follows.The role of X is played by Sm, with Y and Z being in turn, S, 
and Sp. Further, by suppressing the role of Z, we can always specialize 
our definitions to the bivariate case to obtain the quantities C(X—>Y) etc. 
We study the monetary block of our model as a bivariate system, with X 
assuming the values Sb and Y the values Sm
We study the various causality relationships over three frequency ranges: 




























































































R2 : (.082,. 164) corresponding to a medium-run period between 1 to 2 
years.
R3 : (.164,.656) corresponding to a short-run period between 3 months to 
1 year.
In each range, we average over the Fourier frequencies in that range. The 
results of our analysis are presented in Tables 3 to 5.
C. Bootstrapping
No asymptotic theory seems to be available for the distribution of the 
causal measures discussed above. Hence bootstrapping experiments seem 
to be indicated before the results in Tables 5 to 7 can be interpreted. This 
is the third and final stage of our computations.
There are two particular groups of hypotheses of interest. Firstly, whether 
the specific causal measures are significantly different from zero in each 
of periods I and II, and secondly, whether they differ significantly over 
the two periods. Hypothesis testing via bootstrapping in time-series 
models is a rather complicated field, but the papers by Freedman & Peters 
(1984), Runkle (1987) and Li & Maddala (1997) furnish several useful 
guidelines for the practitioner. In dynamic time series models, residual- 
based bootstrapping is recommended over direct sampling, and hence the 
first step in our analysis is bootstrapping the residuals in the reduced- 
form (2). The residuals have to be rescaled before the bootsrapping is 
undertaken ( in the manner outlined by Bergstrom (1999)).
We denote the (rescaled) residuals from the reduced form of (2) over 
Period I as
u, ={u'l,.1u',,u'p,u'u ,u'B};(t = L-T) 
and those over Period II as
V, = {vj,., v] , Vg}; (t = r, +1...T, + r , )
(Tiand T2 are the total number of observations in Periods I and II 
respectively).
Let these be stacked row-wise in two matrices U and V respectively, so 
that
A bootstrap sample may be denoted as +1,....v^+r }, where the
first part of the vector represents a resampling with replacement from the 
rows of U, and the second part a similar resampling from the rows of V. 




























































































contemporaneous correlation structure of the residuals is being preserved. 
However, such a scheme, without modification, is likely to give 
inconsistent estimates in dynamic time-series models (Liu & Singh 
(1992)). A suggested improvement is to incorporate the moving 
overlapping blocks method of Kunsch (1989). Let LI and L2 be the 
chosen block lengths for U and V respectively, then we get (Tr Ll +1) 
blocks in U and (T2-L2 + 1) blocks in V. (The k-th block from U is, for 
example {uk,ukJ.1,....uk+L1.!) and the m-th block from V is 
{vm,vm+i,....vm+L2-i}). We now select randomly bl blocks from U and b2 
blocks from V, where T)=Ll*bl and T2=L2*b2. From the (Ti + T2) sized 
sample of residuals, we construct a new artificial data set {Y*(t), X*(t)}, 
t=l,2....(Ti + T2) in the standard recursive fashion (Runkle (1987)). We 
now compute all the causal measures over both periods from this artificial 
data set, and this completes the full cycle of a single bootstrap 
calculation. The bootstrap experiment is repeated B times.12 
For our problem Ti=180, T2=108 and we select L1=L2 =12 with bl = 15 
and b2=9. The number of bootstrap replications B is set at 5000. The 
simplest way to proceed in our rather complicated hypothesis testing set­
up is to follow Efron & Tibshirani (1993), Ch. 16. Let (31 and (311 denote a 
typical causality measure over Periods I and II respectively. We have two 
groups of tests to perform
1 . Ho:PI = 0 vs Hi : p1 ^ 0 and similarly for P'1
2. Ho : P' = P" vs H, : p1 * P"
Both groups of hypotheses are tested by constructing appropriate 
confidence intervals. Several methods of constructing bootstrap 
confidence intervals are available (e.g. the bootstrap-t, percentile, BCa, 
ABC etc.) The BCa (bias corrected and accelerated) method has the two 
major advantages of being transformation respecting (i.e. the endpoints 
transform correctly if we change the parameter of interest from 0 to some 
function of 0) and it is second-order accurate (i.e. it converges to the true 
confidence interval at rate (1/n) rather than at rate (l/n)°5 as is the case 
with the bootstrap-t and percentile methods). The construction of the BCa 
method may be briefly explained as follows. Let 0 be the parameter of 
interest, 0# its estimate from the original sample and 0 (k) its estimate 
from the k-th bootstrap sample, k = 1,2,.. .B. Let 0'a indicate the 100 a-th 
percentile of the B bootstrap estimates 0*(1), 0*(2),... 0*(B). Then a BCa 
interval of intended coverage (l-2a) is (0£ ,0^), where
12 Even the moving overlapping block bootstrap is not free of problems. Politis & 
Romano (1994) suggest the so-called stationary bootstrap to alleviate some of these 




























































































or, = Q<b + (16)
or, = 0
t> +za
1 -a(b + za)
b + Z(i-g) ] 
1 -  a(b + Z„_0) J (17)
(<t> is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and za is the 
lOOa-th percentile point of the standard normal distribution). The bias- 
correction factor b is obtained as
b = <J?-'{p} (18)
where p is the proportion of the bootstrap replications 0*(k) less than the 
original estimate 0#.
The acceleration a is given by the formula (Efron & Tibshirani (1986))
£ {<?'(.)-<?'(*)}5 
*■ 1___________
6<fX  «?'(.)- 0 W
(19)
where 0#(k) is a jackknife, estimator of 0 from the original sample with 
the k-th value deleted, arid
(20)
Reverting to our original problem, to test the first group of hypotheses, 
we construct a BCa interval for the particular parameter ( p1 or P" ) of 
intended coverage 90% i.e.a = 0.05 and see whether the origin is covered 
by the interval.13 If so, then the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 10% 
level of significance. To test the second group of hypotheses, we 
construct a BCa interval for ( P* - p" ), and then proceed as before. The 
only difference of course, is that in the first group of hypotheses our 
bootstrap sample is either } or j v * , n }, whereas in the
second group of hypotheses the full sample {Hl‘,...n^;v‘+,,....vri+n }, is 
used.
Table 8 summarises the main conclusions of our analysis.We use the 
symbols (+), (-) and (=) to denote respectively the possibilities that a 
causal measure has increased, decreased or remained constant from 
Period I to II. Note that BCa intervals need to be computed for
13 a  is taken somewhat larger than the conventional value (.025), as BCa intervals 




























































































comparisons, only if a particular measure is significant in both periods. 
We adopt the obvious convention of denoting by (+) the situation where a 
measure is insignificant in Period I but significant in Period II, by (-) the 
converse situation, whereas (=) covers the situation when the measure is 
insignificant in both periods.
We now turn to an interpretation of the results.
5. Interpretation of Results
In Section 3, we had set out our objective as the testing of whether the 
following twin relationships had weakened in the wake of financial 
liberalisation in India, viz.
(i) the link between the monetary base (B) and the broad money 
measure (M) and
(ii) the link between money (M) and real output (proxied by I) and 
prices (P)
So far as the link between the monetary base B and the money supply M 
is concerned, Table 5 indicates that the causal coherency was significant 
in the pre-liberalisation period (Period I) in the frequency ranges R1 and 
R2 (corresponding to the long and medium-term periods respectively). 
Thus, prior to liberalisation, the monetary authority seemed to be 
reasonably successful in maintaining control over the money supply via 
its chosen operating instrument B, except in the very short run. This 
control seems to have been totally eroded subsequent to liberalisation (as 
evidenced by the causal coherencies in Period II). From Table 6, we also 
find that the lag (from B to M) seems to have increased both at the long 
and short ends, whereas the message from Table 7 is that the size of the 
money-multiplier (as measured by the causal gain) has increased over the 
medium and long runs. Overall, the association between the monetary 
base and money supply has become more uncertain as well as sluggish, 
but the reponsiveness (in the sense of elasticity) of money supply to the 
base has increased. The last feature, in particular, is in line with a priori 
theoretical expectation (Akhtar (1983) and Podolski (1986)).
The relationship between money and real output (I) is insignificant in 
both periods. While this conclusion agrees broadly with that of Kim 
(1999) for the G-7 countries, it has to be tempered with the realisation 
that I is a very unsatisfactory proxy for national output in the Indian 
context, where agriculture still accounts for about a quarter of the GDP, 
and services for another 40%. (As already noted earlier, our choice of I is 
dictated by the fact of our methods requiring substantial degrees of 
freedom and the unavailability of data on the other components of GDP at 
frequencies higher than the annual). From Table 6, we see that that the 




























































































Table 7 indicates a significant increase in the elasticity of output with 
respect to money (post-liberalisation). The last observation is consistent 
with Tobin’s (1983) hypothesis that financial liberalisation results in a 
significant steepening of the LM curve.
From Table 5, significant causal links from money to prices emerge over 
the long and medium terms in the pre-liberalisation period -  post­
liberalisation only the long-term link persists. The message from Table 6 
suggests additionally that monetary policy might be affecting prices with 
a long lag (the lag is about half the period of the average cycle length in 
the frequency range R1 i.e. about 18 to 24 months). Table 6 further 
indicates that for the long-term, this lag is constant over the two periods, 
though the lag length seems to have increased significantly in Period II 
over the medium and short cycles. There is also a pronounced increase in 
the causal gain at all frequencies (see Table 7), indicating an overall 
increase in the elasticity of both output and prices with respect to money 
supply in the wake of financial liberalisation.
6.Conclusions
Financial innovations have been proceeding apace in the last few decades 
throughout the world , and even the LDCs have not been immune from 
their influence. The innovations have been accompanied by extensive 
dismantling of the regulatory framework. These developments have wide- 
reaching ramifications, the full extent of which has yet to be grasped. 
Empirical modelling of this phenomenon is only recently beginning to 
emerge, but largely in the context of the OECD countries. The evidence 
for the LDCs seems to be largely of an episodic and narrative kind. This 
paper hopes to break some fresh ground, by analysing the evidence for 
the Indian case via formal econometric methods.
The emphasis is on examining the potency of monetary policy in the 
wake of financial liberalisation. In particular, two questions are singled 
out for analysis :
(i) Has the link between the monetary base and money supply 
weakened consequent to liberalisation ? and
(ii) Does money influence output and prices, and how has this 
influence changed with liberalisation?
The basic issue of identifying exogenous monetary policy shocks has 
received much attention in the literature and we follow the mainstream 
approach of identifying such shocks via an SVAR. In the second stage of 
our analysis, the identified shocks are further processed via causality 
measures, originally suggested by Granger (1969). Since no asymptotic 
theory seems to be available for these measures, an extensive set of 




























































































Our results seem to indicate that monetary policy has been rendered 
considerably impotent, consequent to financial liberalisation. The broad 
money aggregate M3 ( M in our econometric exercise) is less firmly 
related to the monetary base, while simultaneously its association with 
macroeconomic magnitudes has weakened (it was never significant with 
real output anyway). The frequency domain results are further supported 
by the FEVD analysis reported in Table 4. By and large, our results are in 
concordance with what the theoretical writing on the subject leads us to 
expect -  as always, however, certain peculiarities are present, which 
cannot be accounted for fully by any existing theory.
The study undoubtedly, suffers from several limitations. We have 
focussed on a single measure of money supply (M3) and our conclusions 
could be sensitive to that fact. As noted in Section 1, a Divisia index, if 
available, would be more appropriate for the study. Unfortunately, for 
India no reliable or officially accepted set of Divisia aggregates, exists. 
This constitutes an important limitation of the study. Another major 
limitation is that open economy considerations have been kept in the 
background, except through the commodity price level P*. Some 
allowance for the exchange rate channel could be made (as Kim (1999) 
seems to have done) by measuring P* in domestic currency (Rupees) 
instead of US$. But in such a case, our identifying restriction that P* is 
not affected contemporaneously by monetary policy shocks, cannot be 
sustained. Nevertheless, the limitation is not as serious, as it would be 
say, in the context of the OECD countries, since total foreign trade as a 
percentage of GDP is barely 15% in the Indian context, so that the Indian 
economy is not fully open now, and certainly was not, prior to 1991. A 
final limitation is imposed by the fact that our methodology is somewhat 
aggregative, and the detailed working of the transmission mechanism, 
cannot be exhibited transparently in the study. This can only be achieved 
by a full-scale computable general-equilibrium model.
However, in spite of the above limitations, the model can hopefully serve 
as a useful benchmark study. Two broad policy conclusions emerge from 
our analysis. Firstly, M3 seems to be becoming increasingly irrelevant, as 
a monetary policy intermediate target. Broader measures of money 
supply, or Divisia aggregates, might be better at performing this role. 
Secondly, monetary base control may, at some stage, have to make way 
for short-term interest rate targeting. This latter development must, 





























































































Test for Structural Breaks
Sup W(tc) in respect of equation for
Break
Interval






















(i) The notation is as per text (Section 4A)
(ii) (*) and (**) denote significance at 5% and 1% levels respectively






































































































X2(s) F(s,T-k-s) X2(s) F(s,T-k-s) X2(2)
SVARI p* 10.72* 2.61* 9.92* 3.11* 11.54**
I 8.31 0.92 6.93 2.09 5.14
P 9.17 1.14 6.22 0.73 1.29
M 8.03 0.84 8.41 1.94 3.68
B 8.85 1.98 7.95 1.54 4.57
SVAR II p* 10.46* 2.74* 9.58* 2.66* 7.34*
I 9.32 1.17 8.42 2.27 5.47
P 8.50 1.46 7.19 1.84 1.88
M 6.38 0.67 8.06 1.63 2.51
B 8.77 1.05 9.61* 2.59* 6.11*
Notes:
(i) The LM test is examining for serial correlation upto the fourth order (i.e. 
s=4). Similarly the ARCH test is for ARCH effects upto the fourth, k is the 
number of regressors, which is 42 in our case (6 lags on each of 5 variables 
plus a constant and 11 seasonal dummies). The number of effective 
observations (T) is 174 for SVAR I and 102 for SVAR II. Thus for SVAR I, 
the relevant F statistic is F(4,128) and for SVAR II, it is F(4,60)
(ii) (*) and (**) denote significance at 5% and 1% levels respectively





























































































Contemporaneous Coefficients in the Structural Models
Coefficient SVAR 1 SVAR II
d 2, -0.17 -0.29*




D43 J 37** 1.94*
D45 2.61* 3.21*




D 55 0.88 0.75
Notes:
(i) (*) and (**) denote significance at 5% and 1% levels respectively
(ii) <j> is restricted at -1 in SVARI



















































































































(i) The standard errors (displayed in brackets), are calculated by bootstrapping in the 

































































































Period I BCa Period II BCa
X=SM R1 0.001 (-.0022,.0018) 0.084 (-.016,.103)
Y=S, R2 0.0008 (-.0037..0015) 0.082 (-.011..099)
Z=SP R3 0.0000 — 0.015 (-.024,.032)
X=SM R1 0.140* (.091,.236) 0.116* (.081..230)
Y=SP R2 0.329* (.205, .361) 0.018 (-.007,-031)
Z=Si R3 0.039 (-.008,.053) 0.003 (-.012,.009)
X=SB R1 0.561* (.509, .593) 0.081 (-.013„135)
Y= SM R2 0.414* (.378,.443) 0.056 (-.008,.098)
R3 0.051 (-.019,.074) 0.012 (-.091,-031)
Notes:
(i) (*) denotes significance at the intended level of significance viz. 10%. On the 





























































































Causal Lag \ D(X->y TZ) or D(X-VY)]
Shocks Frequency
Range
Period I BCa Period II BCa
X=SM R1 0.0016 (-.018,.011) 0.490* (.443..513)
Y=S, R2 0.021 (-.029,.040) 0.417* (.388,.447)
Z=SP R3 0.057 (-.038..073) 0.409* (.374,.434)
X=SM R1 0.523* (.487, .551) 0.522* (.493,.546)
Y=Sp R2 0.155* (.106, .193) 0.385* (.342,.408)
Z=S, R3 0.041 (-.008,-096) 0.331* (.309,359)
X=SB R1 0.179* (.120, .207) 0.298* (.268,326)
Y=Sm R2 0.171* (.103,.198) 0.136* (.107..162)
R3 0.187* (.119,.223) 0.289* (.266,313)
Notes:





























































































Causal Gain f G(X->YTZ) or G(X->Y)]
Shocks Frequency
Range
Period I B C a Period II B C a
X = S M R1 0.08 (-0.21,0.13) 0.39* (0.28, 0.54)
Y = S , R2 0.19 (-0.03, 0.28) 0.34* (0.21,0.46)
Z = S p R3 0.57* (0.34,0.77) 0.76* (0.62,0.95)
X = S M R1 0.19 (-0.05, 0.31) 0.29* (0.14,0.48)
Y = S P R2 0.15 (-0.06, 0.26) 0.38* (0.18,0.51)
Z = S , R3 0.04 (-0.19, 0.12) 0.33* (0.17,0.46)
X = S B R1 0.49* (0.28,0.66) 0.73* (0.55,0.91)
Y =  S M R2 0.24* (0.09,0.47) 0.41* (0.23, 0.66)
R3 0.06 (-0.14, 0.19) 0.02 (-0.19, 0.21)
Notes:

















































































































Z = S p
R1 (=) (+) (+)
R2 (=) (+) (+)
R3 (=) (+) (+)
(-0.29,-0.05)
X=SM
Y = S p
























(i) The notation in this table, is explained towards the end of Section 4C. Note that 
BCa intervals are calculated only in those cases, where the measure is significant in 
both Periods I and II. The intended coverage of the BCa intervals is 90% ( see 
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